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Summary 
 
Extreme weather causes substantial adverse socio-economic impacts by damaging and disrupting the 
infrastructure services that underpin modern society.  Globally, $2.5tn a year is spent on infrastructure which 
is typically designed to last decades, over which period projected changes in the climate will modify 
infrastructure performance.  A systems approach has been developed to assess risks across all infrastructure 
sectors to guide national policy making and adaptation investment.  The method analyses diverse evidence of 
climate risks and adaptation actions, to assess the urgency and extent of adaptation required.  Application to 
the UK shows that despite recent adaptation efforts, risks to infrastructure outweigh opportunities.  Flooding 
is the greatest risk to all infrastructure sectors: even if the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 2°C is 
achieved, the number of users reliant on electricity infrastructure at risk of flooding would double, whilst a 
4°C rise could triple UK flood damage.  Other risks are significant, for example: 5% and 20% of river 
catchments would be unable to meet water demand with 2°C and 4°C global warming respectively. Increased 
interdependence between infrastructure systems, especially from energy and information and communication 
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technology (ICT), are amplifying risks, but adaptation action is limited by lack of clear responsibilities.  A 
programme to build national capability is urgently required to improve infrastructure risk assessment. 
Introduction 
Infrastructure provides the critical services such as heating, lighting, mobility and sanitation that are essential 
for modern society.  The current variability in climate already compromises infrastructure performance, and 
disruption or complete failure of these services causes significant adverse social, economic and environmental 
impacts.  For example, inundation of water treatment plants and electricity distribution substations left 
hundreds of thousands of people without power and water in southwest England [1].  In 2012, Hurricane 
Sandy caused substantial damage to New York’s infrastructure networks, however, loss of the services these 
networks provided magnified other economic losses and also hampered recovery efforts [2].  During the 
winter of 2013/14, storms in the UK led to loss of power for over 150,000 homes for significant periods of time, 
closure of Gatwick Airport, disruption of rail/road travel including complete severance of the South Devon 
Main Line in Devon for two months, in addition to general damage to buildings and to other infrastructure 
assets [3].  A year later, more floods disrupted electricity supplies for tens of thousands of people, caused the 
failure of a number of bridges, and disrupted mobile and broadband communication networks [4]. The 
importance of infrastructure, and the significant impacts from its disruption, are echoed in other extreme 
weather events around the world [5, 6, 7]. 
 
Climate change will alter average weather conditions and the nature of extreme weather in the UK and 
globally [8].  Gradual shifts in long-term trends (e.g. a rise in average temperatures) will reduce the capacity 
and efficiency of some infrastructure.  This will be compounded by increases in the frequency of severe 
weather events, such as flooding, which will lead to increased disruption of infrastructure.  Climate change 
can thereby alter the design life of infrastructure and the effectiveness of the services it provides.  Globally, 
$2.5tn a year is currently spent on infrastructure [9].  In the UK alone, the National Infrastructure Plan [10] sets 
out £300 billion of planned investment across all sectors of infrastructure by 2020/21.  Infrastructure is 
typically associated with large capital costs and with lifespans of 30-200 years. Furthermore, there is limited 
flexibility once built.  Overall, given the sensitivity of infrastructure performance to climate and that decisions 
on design and renovation have long-lasting implications which are hard to reverse, assessing the climate risks 
to infrastructure must therefore be a priority.  To avoid longer term impacts on people and the economy, it is 
essential that future infrastructure investments, as well as the adaptation of existing infrastructure, are made 
in the context of these risks.  
 
National assessments typically consider a broad range of climate change impacts (Table 1), including water, 
transport and energy infrastructure sectors, but usually have only limited or no consideration of climate risks 
to solid waste, information and communication technology (ICT), flood and coastal protection infrastructure.  
Almost all the national assessments studied assess risks on the basis of published evidence, and whilst this is 
summarised in different ways, very few assessments prioritise and rank the risks identified, even in relative 
terms.  In the UK, the 2008 Climate Change Act requires a national climate change risk assessment every five 
years.  As a result, the first UK Climate Change Risk Assessment [11] was completed in 2012 and took the 
approach of constructing a series of quantitative response functions that related climate variables (e.g. sea 
level rise) to risk (e.g. coastal flood risk) across a number of sectors. The approach developed here, and 
subsequently applied in the second UK Climate Change Risk Assessment [12], does not seek to replicate the 
detailed analysis of the first, but instead uses it as a starting point for a systematic review and assessment of 
new evidence of current and future risks to infrastructure.  The methodology is introduced in Section 2, and 
its application to assess risks to UK infrastructure reported in Section 3.  The paper concludes with discussion 
about the key findings, efficacy of the approach especially in comparison to the first UK assessment, and 
uncertainties and recommendations for future development of methods for national assessment of climate 
change risks to infrastructure. 
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A framework for climate risk assessment of national 
infrastructure 
 
Climate change risk assessment of infrastructure needs to consider a wide range of current and possible future 
climatic conditions, their related risks and opportunities for infrastructure sectors, and the extent to which 
current or planned policies and proposals will manage them.   
 
(a) A systems view of infrastructure 
 
An infrastructure risk assessment must consider more than just impacts to physical components and assets 
such as tracks, pipes and wires.  It is crucial to consider the resources that these physical components move 
about, and the services they provide that the public and businesses depend upon.  Furthermore, these systems 
are all interconnected.   Increasingly, infrastructure depends on other infrastructure to work, not just 
technically, but also socially and economically.   
 
A risk assessment must therefore take a systems view of infrastructure that requires consideration of a 
number of key elements beyond just the obvious physical assets (Figure 1).  Infrastructure plays an important 
role in modulating both the use of natural environment resources that is directly affected by climate change, for 
example water resources, but also for mitigating environmental hazards, such as hydrological extremes, that 
perpetrate climate risks.  Individual physical assets interconnect to provide a network that joins locations 
demanding a particular resource or service, with areas that can supply it.  The resources conveyed by 
infrastructure include vehicles, water, electricity and data as well as the materials used in infrastructure 
construction which enable services such as warmth, mobility, sanitation, transportation, and communication 
that benefit a wide range of individual, business, or other users.  These are all influenced by an array of actors, 
institutions, regulation, protocols and processes that have influence over all parts of the infrastructure system.  
Climate change can impact directly the different constituent elements of the infrastructure system, whilst 
actions taken to manage climate risks may be implemented across any of these elements.   
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual view of infrastructure as a system (from [20]) 
 
(b) Systems risk assessment of infrastructure 
 
A systems approach to climate change risk assessment of infrastructure has therefore been developed that 
comprises a number of stages (Figure 2). 
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(i) Analysis of climate variables (e.g. rainfall, temperature and wind) to understand change over 
time, and how the frequency and magnitude of hazards such as floods or heat waves will 
subsequently be altered.  The climate change context used in the 2017 UK Climate Change Risk 
Assessment is summarised in [21, 22]. 
(ii) Characterisation of each infrastructure asset, in particular its fragility and capacity, to understand 
its response to extreme events and changes in climate. Typically, climate loadings of larger 
magnitude or wider spatial coverage increase the likelihood of failure or lead to greater reduction 
of performance of individual assets, and consequently the impacts of failure.  
(iii) Analysis of network-wide effects that occur as a result of impacts on individual or multiple 
components and system functions. Typically, higher climate loadings, and events that directly 
impact more of the network, lead to increased impacts. However, the magnitude of impacts is also 
mediated by network properties such as the number of backup or redundant components.  
(iv) Analysis of interactions and interdependencies between infrastructure networks to understand 
cascading impacts.  
(v) Assessment of systemic risks that are related to the loss of infrastructure services that 
consequently lead to indirect impacts on economic growth, social wellbeing and environmental 
protection. These broader interactions are considered in [23].  
(vi) Adaptations may be implemented across the infrastructure system. This may involve asset- or 
network-scale engineering, policy or regulatory interventions, or working with users to manage 
demand for services.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 A systems approach to a climate change risk assessment framework for infrastructure, with some indicative 
variables or risks at each assessment stage (from [20]). 
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The significance of a risk depends on the combination of the likelihood of a climatic event and its impacts. The 
magnitude of impacts is often mediated by asset characteristics, including fragility, capacity and redundancy. 
They are further mediated by the capacity and vulnerability of organisations and users affected. Low 
likelihood, high impact, events require different management to more frequent, low impact, events. In 
particular, the lowest probability events require special attention in terms of warning and community 
preparedness as it may not be possible to identify the hazards, let alone protect against them. A climate 
change risk assessment should therefore consider a full range of loadings, impacts and possible responses.  
 
Infrastructure adaptation options can be compared on the basis of the impact that they are expected to have on 
reducing the frequency and severity of climate effects. There are four main strategies to manage climate 
change risks to infrastructure: 
(i) Reduce the likelihood of infrastructure component failure by providing enhanced protection. 
(ii) Improve the performance of infrastructure components so they are able to operate under a wider 
range of climatic conditions. 
(iii) Provide redundancy to increase the capacity, number of alternative connections and diversity of 
components and backup systems. 
(iv) Build capacity in organisations and communities, and via technological advancement, to deliver a 
fast and effective response to, and recovery from, climate disruption. 
In a systems assessment, climate change adaptation is not limited to ‘major’ engineering options, but a wider 
set of interventions across the whole infrastructure system at a range of temporal and spatial scales.  
Adaptations include technical options but also regulatory, policy and community responses are crucial to 
enhancing the adaptive capacity (potential to adapt to climate variability and change) of infrastructure 
systems. However, much of the evidence of adaptation activity for UK infrastructure focuses on engineering 
responses, as the benefits of these are typically easier to assess quantitatively.   
 
(c) Evidence assessment 
 
The first stage of the risk assessment is to identify where there are causal relationships between infrastructure 
sectors and individual climate hazards (Figure 3), which might be altered as a result of climate change. 
 
 
        
                  Sector 
 
Hazard 
Water and 
waste water 
Transport Energy 
generation 
Energy 
distribution 
Flood and coastal 
erosion risk 
management 
Solid 
waste 
ICT 
Floods        
Water scarcity        
High 
temperatures 
       
(Wind) Storms        
Geohazards        
Figure 3 Key relationships between climate hazards and each infrastructure sector. A light shade denotes a relationship 
exists, a darker shade denotes the relationship is strong. Dependencies between infrastructure sectors are not shown here. 
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Models and quantitative evidence exist for some of the aspects of the systems risk assessment framework in 
Figure 2, but information on climate risks to infrastructure is recorded in a variety of formats and in a wide 
range of papers, reports and other material.  Furthermore, the quality of the evidence base is extremely 
variable across the many infrastructure sectors, individual assets and their interdependencies.  In the absence 
of individual models, or even national scale models for all the individual sectors, available evidence was 
analysed using the framework set out by Warren et al. (this issue) to answer three questions: 
1. What is the current and future level of climate risk to infrastructure?   
2. To what extent are these risks going to be managed, and what is the subsequent residual risk, taking 
into account adaptation commitments and autonomous adaptation? 
3. Are there benefits of further action in the next 5 years?   
In each case the quality of the evidence was considered to determine the level of uncertainty (low, medium or 
high confidence) in the assessment.  Subsequently, and taking into account reported adaptation actions, an 
assessment was conducted about the urgency and type of adaptation action required over the next five years 
to manage these long-term risks.  
 
In all, 309 sources of evidence [20] were reviewed and used to identify priority risks in the present day and 
under future climatic and socio-economic conditions.  An initial assessment was made by the authors, before 
submitting it to two external reviews by stakeholders from over 30 academic, government and non-
government organisations, as well as infrastructure utility companies and consultancies.  Over 650 comments 
were received as part of this review process and led to several refinements as assumptions and expert 
judgements incorporated new evidence [24].  An assessment of the urgency of climate change risks to 
infrastructure is summarised in Table 2.  Key contributions from the evidence base are summarised in the 
following sections, and the rationale is described in full by the Committee on Climate Change [25].   
 
Climate change risks to the UK’s infrastructure 
 
Each infrastructure sector faces a number of climate risks, the magnitude of which is modulated by specific 
geographical or engineering features.  The most significant risks for UK infrastructure are identified and 
summarised according to climate risk in the following sections, and by sector in Figure 4.  The main 
opportunity identified is a reduced frequency, although not cessation, of extreme cold events that impact 
upon water, transport, digital and energy infrastructure.  However, reduced frequency of severe events can 
increase vulnerability to individual extreme events if the capacity to cope is reduced, as occurred during the 
particularly cold Winter 2010/11 [26]. 
 
(a) Flood damage and disruption  
 
Flooding is the most significant climate change risk to UK infrastructure, affecting all infrastructure sectors.  A 
significant number of infrastructure assets are already situated in locations that are exposed to river, coastal, 
groundwater or surface water flooding.  Flooding of infrastructure can lead to lengthy disruption and high 
repair costs.  Table 3 shows that a significant proportion of infrastructure has been found to be at risk of 
flooding from multiple sources [27].   
 
Flood risk from river, coastal, pluvial and groundwater sources is projected to increase across the UK, even 
after accounting for the most ambitious adaptation plans by national and local authorities.  Under a scenario 
of 4°C of global warming by the 2080s, the number of assets exposed could double.  For example, currently 
some 2,400km of the UK rail network is vulnerable to flooding and this could rise by 120% by the 2080s [27]. 
More intense rainfall associated with this scenario will also increase the frequency of sewer flooding and 
combined sewer overflow (CSO) events.  Infrastructure networks near rivers will be at risk from projected 
higher flows and subsequent river bank erosion.   Bridges are especially vulnerable: historically the annual 
probability of observing a flood event in which one or more railway bridges fails is 1 in 2.6 years (Annual 
Exceedance Probability, AEP=0.390) [28].   Projected changes to winter river flows would increase scour by 
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over 8% at 1 in 20 of all the 4,239 railway and 8,664 main road bridges, placing them at high risk of failure by 
2080 [29]. 
 
Coastal infrastructure is particularly at risk from storm surges and rising sea levels, as well as increased rates 
of coastal erosion in some locations. Rising sea levels of 0.5 – 1 m by the end of the century will increase the 
proportion of assets vulnerable to coastal flooding, as well as increasing rates of coastal erosion in some 
locations.  The annual cost of maintenance of coastal defence could increase by 150 – 400% [30].   
 
(b) Droughts and reduced water availability  
 
The UK currently has an overall surplus of water availability, of approximately 2000 Ml/day.  However, 
supply and demand are finely balanced in many catchments.  In the absence of further adaptations, by the 
2050s, a high population growth and high climate change scenarios will see widespread deficits which will be 
largest in south-east England and the conjunctive use zones in the north of England [31].  Extended periods of 
low rainfall, and associated low river flows and groundwater levels, will reduce the availability of water 
resources, both for consumption but also for freshwater abstractions to cool power plants.   
 
(c) Storm damage and disruption 
 
Overhead cables used for energy distribution, electrified rail, and some ICT networks such as those delivering 
broadband to rural areas are vulnerable to lightning strikes, high winds and tree- and debris-related damage 
associated with storms.  There is broad uncertainty surrounding climate projections for wind, but lightning 
strike disruptions to the energy network may increase between 4 - 36% within different regions by the 2080s 
under a 3°C climate scenario [32], with a similar increase in the incidence of damage to mobile phone base 
stations.  The impact of such events is relatively low, compared to events such as flooding, as damage can 
usually be repaired quickly and services rapidly restored. 
 
(d) Geohazards (including subsidence and landslides) 
 
Extended periods of rainfall increase slope and embankment instability.  This risk is most significant for road 
and rail infrastructure, where nearly 2% of the UK’s network is at high risk of landslide disruption and a 
further 6% at medium risk [29].  On average, 50 landslides per year disrupt rail services, although over the 
winter of 2013/14 there were 105 earthwork failures on the rail network alone [33].  The site-specific 
characteristics of slopes and embankments makes it especially difficult to take a proactive approach to 
adaptation. 
 
Subsidence due to shrink–swell processes, and desiccation-cracking with associated reduction in stability, is 
driven by cycles of drought and heavy rain [34].  This can damage railway track, road surfaces and buried 
infrastructure such as waste and water pipes. Risks are most significant in areas where shrink–swell 
susceptible clay soils dominate, especially around London and the east of England.  The impact of climate 
change on persistent rainfall events is also uncertain, but recent prolonged periods of rainfall have acted as 
triggers for geohzards, for example the M3 motorway was closed for two days during the 2013/14 winter 
storms following the sudden appearance of a sinkhole [35]. 
 
(e) High temperatures  
 
Railways, ICT and electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure are all susceptible to 
extremes in temperature. The 2003 heat wave cost £2.5 million in repairs to the rail network, and the frequency 
of rail buckling events is expected to be four times higher under a 2°C climate change scenario [36].  Track can 
be pre-tensioned to suit prevailing temperatures but the greater range of high and low temperatures likely to 
be experienced over a year may cause operational difficulties.  
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Increases in air and water temperatures affect the output and efficiency of steam and gas turbine-based 
generators.  This would also decrease the effective capacity of electricity networks by reducing the average 
rating of overhead lines in the distribution network by 6 – 10% by the 2080s for the 4°C climate scenario, 
although the reduction could be up to 27% for some components [37, 38].  However, reductions in 
performance are smaller than recent historical load growth which has typically been 1.5-2% per annum [37]. 
 
 
Figure 4 Relationship between global temperature change relative to pre-industrial era, and some of the key 
climate change risks to UK infrastructure.  A high risk of flooding here refers to a likelihood of flooding more 
frequently than 1 in 75 years (AEP≥0.013).  The assessment of global change risks is taken from [12]. 
 
(f) Infrastructure interdependencies 
 
Infrastructures are increasingly dependent on each other – for power, control (via ICT) and access for 
deliveries or servicing.  Moreover, a range of other mechanisms can create interdependencies that impact 
upon climate risks [39].  All UK infrastructure sectors have identified failure of another infrastructure sector as 
a risk to their own networks [40].  However, despite efforts in recent years to encourage infrastructure 
operators to work together and address vulnerabilities [41], there is usually insufficient information to fully 
appraise the risks between systems.  There is presently no formalised framework for engagement and 
collaborative working which, when coupled with commercial and security sensitivities, remain barriers to 
routine data sharing and co-operation.  In this assessment, five dependency risks were identified as especially 
sensitive to climate change risks. 
 
(i) Dependence on water infrastructure 
 
The UK’s current national energy generation mix requires significant volumes of water for cooling, and 23% of 
the UK’s energy is generated by power plants cooled from freshwater sources [42].  Inland power generation 
in England is most vulnerable to reduced water availability [43].  Water demand for cooling is influenced by 
the electricity generation mix, decarbonisation strategies that involve high levels of carbon capture and 
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storage could double freshwater consumption by the 2050s [44].  Even with no climate change impacts the 
projected growth of cooling water abstractions could reach the current licensed abstraction limit in some 
catchments by the 2040s [45].  This would compound the drought risk described previously which did not 
consider electricity generation mix. 
 
(ii) Dependence on power infrastructure 
 
All infrastructure sectors require power for some, if not all, of their assets.  Analysis of the impact of a 1 in 
1000 year flood (AEP=0.001) in the Thames catchment showed approximately 12 million people rely on power 
infrastructure within the floodplain [46].  Moreover, loss of this power infrastructure could disrupt 
wastewater treatment infrastructure serving over 7 million people, water supply infrastructure serving over 
10 million and telecommunications infrastructure serving over 9 million.  Although this analysis did not have 
information on the level of flood protection of individual assets, it highlights the importance of electricity 
infrastructure in supporting other sectors.  Current trends in energy infrastructure, such as uptake of electric 
vehicles and the electrification of railway lines, and decentralisation of energy systems, will alter the nature of 
these risks although there is limited evidence of the long term implications.  
 
(iii) Dependence on ICT infrastructure 
 
Modern infrastructure is increasingly reliant on ICT for monitoring, remote operation, clock synchronisation, 
and coordination of emergency response during extreme events.  For example, the loss of power to an internet 
hub in Italy led to failure of other power stations disrupting 56 million people across Italy and Switzerland 
[47].  There has been no comparable event in the UK, but during the 2015/16 winter floods in York damaged 
assets supporting wired and wireless ICT networks, causing loss of banking, broadband and emergency 
services at distances of up to 100 km away [48].  Insufficient data about the location of ICT assets and their role 
in managing other infrastructure sectors has hindered comprehensive analysis.  However, ICT has been 
shown to be the second most important infrastructure network for the operation of the UK’s rail network; for 
example, flooding of the 7% of assets in the low flood risk (less than 1-in-200 year likelihood of flooding) 
would disrupt 46% of passenger journeys [49]. Although there is limited available data about assets and 
adaptation actions, it is known that ICT is increasingly important to the operation of all other infrastructure 
networks, and it has been shown that this increased interdependency would also increase the risk of cascading 
failure across the entire infrastructure system and beyond [47,50].   
 
(iv) Dependence on transport infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure networks are often dependent on transport infrastructure for continued operation, for example 
to ensure access for resources such as fuel, personnel and emergency response.  Failure of key infrastructure 
components such as bridges, or landslides that block important transport corridors, can significantly increase 
travel times as a result of rerouting of journeys [51].  Loss of the only road bridge in Workington in 2009 
required residents to make a two-hour journey to reach the other side of the river causing significant local 
social and economic impacts [52].  A 1 in 200 year (AEP=0.005) flood event in Newcastle-upon-Tyne would 
block multiple roads simultaneously, and during peak travel time this would cause disruption equivalent to 
1000 passenger days [53]. Analysis of a 1 in 200 year flood event on key fuel and food depots in the Shetland 
Islands, shows that the subsequent disruption to supply chains could lead to depletion of stocks across the 
region within a few days, echoing observations in New York after hurricane Sandy [54]. 
 
(v) Geographical dependence 
 
Co-sited cables, fibre optics, road, railway, pipe and other infrastructure – even if not physically connected but 
running in parallel along the same route – can amplify climate risks as a single event can disrupt multiple 
services unless assets are designed to interoperate [55].  Limited information on these risks exists, but using 
best available data hotspots of geographical infrastructure interdependence across England and Wales have 
been identified [56].  These hotspots reflect the number of users directly or indirectly dependent on all 
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infrastructure in any given location.  Unsurprisingly, large population centres are shown to be concentrations 
of interdependencies, but less intuitively many hotspots are in the urban periphery areas as critical assets are 
usually not located in city centres, whilst critical infrastructure ‘corridors’ that span the country are also 
revealed, highlighting the risk to disruption of multiple services from a large scale event [56]. 
 
Discussion 
 
(a) Balancing detail and scope in national risk assessment 
 
This analysis, undertaken as part of the second UK Climate Change Risk Assessment, had a wider scope than 
other national assessments (Table 1) as it included a broader analysis of risks to other sectors such as solid 
waste, ICT, flood and coastal erosion infrastructure.  Furthermore, it considered all infrastructures together, 
including assessment of a number of risks resulting from infrastructure interdependence.   In the five years 
since the first [11] assessment there has been improved analysis of risks from flooding, bridge scour, rail 
buckling, windstorms and interdependencies.  Although the results are not comparable in absolute terms, no 
manifest change in the trends of key risks was identified, and the risks still outweigh the opportunities.  
 
The methodology used in this national scale assessment allows integration of evidence in a consistent way, is 
more appropriate for handling uncertainties, and can incorporate qualitative evidence that is ill-suited to more 
quantitative modelling exercises.  However, by only relying on, and interpreting, existing evidence there is 
limited opportunity for learning from new analysis; although it does afford the opportunity to identify 
knowledge gaps where extra analysis is required.  The classification of urgency used here was tailored to 
support development of a National Adaptation Plan mandated by the UK Climate Change Act, however, the 
principle of translating risk information into a recommendation for action is useful as it provides a direct link 
between the assessment and policy requirements.   
 
(b) Consistency of climate risk management information 
 
This analysis reviewed a large body of evidence, which revealed enormous diversity in methodologies, quality 
and completeness of information analysed.  Studies have used a wide range of different scenarios, spatial 
scales, timeframes and impact metrics to assess risks. The majority of evidence is compiled from observations 
or sub-national analyses, with only a small proportion of the evidence providing a national-scale assessment 
of infrastructure risks.  However, many national scale studies are reliant on the same underpinning datasets 
(e.g. the Environment Agency’s NaFRA data layer provides a national flood depth-probability map [57]).  
Furthermore, evidence is not evenly distributed across the range of climate risks to infrastructure.  Whilst 
there is an abundance of material on flood risks, and to a lesser extent on drought risks, a comprehensive 
national assessment of slope stability risk currently defies analysis because of the sensitivity of asset 
performance to very specific local conditions.  
 
Across the UK’s infrastructure sectors there are a wide range of approaches to infrastructure governance, 
regulation, data collection and data accessibility.  Some infrastructures like roads are in the public sector 
(though sometimes privately operated) whilst others, like telecoms and England’s water industry, are in the 
private sector; for railways a hybrid ownership approach exists. This poses challenges for risk assessment, but 
especially when considering the risk reduction benefits of adaptation because measures are reported 
inconsistently, and in many cases, not recorded at all.  This lack of standardisation and incomplete availability 
of data has posed a significant challenge for this assessment, and highlights a current lack of a systematic 
approach to understanding climate risks on infrastructure.  There are good reasons to encourage diversity in 
the data and methods to build the evidence basis for climate change risk assessment, this can ensure a broader 
set of insights, but avoids too much correlation and overlap in the evidence base.  However, a shared and 
open approach to recording the metadata associated with key attributes of the evidence (e.g. geography; 
timeframes; scenarios; recording adaptation measures) is strongly recommended as this would greatly 
facilitate the assimilation of risk information. 
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(c) Significant knowledge gaps 
 
A number of significant uncertainties, beyond consistency of reporting, and gaps in our understanding of 
infrastructure risks have been identified that should be addressed by more fundamental research.   
 
The impact of climate change on wind, lightning, offshore waves and currents, and sub-hourly rainfall 
intensity, is highly uncertain.  However, there is a direct relationship between these weather processes and 
infrastructure risks, especially for assets designed for a long lifespan. Developments in high-resolution 
modelling of convective storms [58] may be able to reduce the uncertainties related to these risks.   
 
Infrastructure performance, including deterioration over the long-term and incidents of failure, is poorly 
recorded.  Given the long lifespan of many assets and the timeframes over which climate change manifests, 
this is a significant uncertainty in risk assessment.  More comprehensive laboratory and long term field 
research, as exemplified by [59], are required to improve understanding of long term infrastructure 
deterioration and failure processes.  This must be complemented by a more exhaustive, consistent, and 
forensic approach by infrastructure stakeholders to recording and analysing the limited sample of 
infrastructure failures. 
 
Interconnections and dependencies between infrastructure systems are already important.  The impact of 
cascading failures across infrastructures has shown that it can be enormous, but even for smaller scale events 
these interactions can compound impacts.  Furthermore, infrastructure is increasingly reliant on international 
connections, whether physical asset connections between countries, or movement of resources to operate 
infrastructure services.  Methods to enable these risks to be analysed are emerging [39, 60] but in-depth 
understanding of these risks and the modes by which failure is transmitted, remain poor and requires greater 
study.  This knowledge gap is greatest for those interdependencies related to ICT, where analysis is hampered 
by limited knowledge of the location of assets and the logical operation of these systems.  As infrastructure 
becomes increasingly interdependent, with ICT having the most critical role in the ‘smartening’ of 
infrastructure and cities, it is increasingly important to understand these risks. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Infrastructure merits specific consideration in climate change risk assessment, and due to increased 
interdependency, the multiple infrastructure sectors warrant collective consideration.  A systems framework 
for national scale climate change risk assessment for infrastructure has therefore been developed and used to 
analyse over 300 sources of data to prioritise adaptation actions for the UK’s infrastructure.  The assessment 
shows that infrastructure in the UK is already experiencing significant impacts as a result of the natural 
variability of our climate. Projected changes in climate will reduce the life expectancy of existing infrastructure 
and the effectiveness of the services it provides.  These risks far outweigh potential opportunities, such as 
reduced cold-related disruption, associated with climate change. Furthermore, climate change will interact 
with, and exacerbate, the impact of other pressures that include population growth and ageing infrastructure. 
 
There is evidence that significant adaptation steps to manage climate change risks have been implemented, or 
are underway, across most infrastructure sectors.  Where sufficient information is available to assess their 
effectiveness, these adaptation investments will maintain, or in some instances reduce, climate risks over the 
next decade or two.  However, beyond this projected changes in climate are likely to outpace current 
adaptation plans.   
 
While understanding of risks to individual infrastructure sectors has improved, the impacts of climate change 
are expected to be amplified by interconnectivities and interdependencies between these sectors.  
Understanding of these is less comprehensive, and current governance arrangements mean that 
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responsibilities for assessing and managing risks from interdependencies are unclear. This remains an area of 
priority for future research. 
 
The method presented here for assessing climate change risks to national infrastructure is appropriate given 
the limited availability, and substantial variation, of evidence and tools to support a national scale assessment.  
However, given the importance of infrastructure to the functioning of a modern society, there is a need to 
enhance capabilities in infrastructure climate change risk assessment.  A starting point will be agreement of a 
common baseline, some standardised socio-economic and adaptation scenarios to provide common reference 
points (but not limit development of other scenarios), and improved records and metadata about adaptation 
actions.  However, to fully tackle the issues described in the discussion, a national capability needs to go 
further and must ultimately provide a common and internally coherent analytical framework that enables 
different risks to be fairly compared.  It must be able to analyse the impact of ‘persistent’ events (e.g. repeated 
sequence of storms or floods, in the same or multiple locations) and simultaneous hazards (e.g. wind storm 
coupled with flooding).  This can only be achieved by producing a national database of the location, function, 
design and condition of assets, and a record of any adaptation to these assets in order to provide a reliable 
assessment of current and future infrastructure performance.  This work has highlighted that there is a 
substantial body of work that can be built upon, however, research and development is currently disjointed 
and hampered by a lack of sustained investment.   
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Table 1 Summary of the infrastructure aspects in past national climate change risk assessments.  A tick indicates that risks 
to the infrastructure associated with the sector were considered; for example, in all assessments flood risks were 
considered but the focus was on the impact of flooding rather than the flood and coastal erosion infrastructure.  A cross 
indicates that the infrastructure sector was not assessed systematically or in detail, although in some cases risks to the 
sector were acknowledged in a brief statement. 
 
National Summary of approach Infrastructure sector Interdependencies 
Assessment Water Flood and coastal 
erosion 
Energy Transport ICT Solid Waste 
UK 2012 [11] 
 Quantitative risk assessment 
 Sector specific response 
function created that relate 
magnitude of impacts to 
climate change hazard 
 Limited sub-national (Wales, 
Scotland, Northern Ireland) 
assessment 
      
 Water for energy generation 
 Recognition, but limited analysis, of a 
number of other modes of 
infrastructure interdependence 
UK 2017 [12] 
 Review of published evidence 
 Limited sub-national (England, 
Wales, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland) assessment 
      
 Water for energy generation 
 Transport for resource movements 
 Cascading impacts of energy 
disruption 
 Smartening of infrastructure with ICT 
 Geographical co-location 
USA 2014 [13] 
 Review of published evidence 
 Sub-national assessment of 8 
regions and the coastal zone 
      
 Water for energy generation, and 
some other water-energy interactions 
 Cascading impacts of energy 
disruption 
 Recognition, but limited analysis, of a 
number of modes of 
interdependencies in urban and rural 
areas 
Canada [14] 
 Review of published evidence 
 Limited sub-national 
(Northern, Coastal regions, 
Great Lakes) assessment 
      
 Water for energy generation 
 Recognition, but limited analysis, of a 
number of other modes of 
infrastructure interdependence 
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 Limited analysis of relative 
importance of risks 
Netherlands 
2015 [15] 
 Review of published evidence 
 Broad in coverage but not as 
in-depth analysis of literature 
 Limited analysis of relative 
importance of risks 
      
 Water for energy generation 
 Transport for resource movements 
 Cascading impacts of energy 
disruption 
 Smartening of infrastructure with ICT 
 International dependencies 
 
Finland [16] 
 Synthesis of findings from a 
number of national scale 
research programs 
 Limited analysis of relative 
importance of risks 
      
 Recognition, but limited analysis, of a 
number of modes of infrastructure 
interdependence 
Australia [17] 
 Review of published evidence 
 Limited analysis of relative 
importance of risks 
      
 Recognition, but limited analysis, of 
cascading failures and water for 
energy generation 
South Africa 
[18] 
 Review of published evidence 
 Broad coverage of risks but 
limited analysis of relative 
importance 
 No sub-national assessment 
      
 Interdependencies between water 
infrastructure, food and biofuel. 
 Other non-infrastructure 
interdependencies. 
Germany [19]  Review of published evidence       
 No explicit consideration of energy 
infrastructure, but interdependencies 
between water infrastructure, food 
and biofuel considered. 
 Other non-infrastructure 
interdependencies. 
 
  
 
Table 2 Summary of the adaptation urgency for climate change risks to UK infrastructure. The adaptation urgency applies 
to the entire United Kingdom (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) unless specified. 
More adaptation action 
needed over next five years 
above those already planned 
Sustaining current 
adaptation action is 
sufficient to manage 
risks 
Research needed to 
enable assessment of 
the need for action  
Maintain a watching 
brief of monitoring and 
review of needs 
 Risks to infrastructure 
services from river, surface 
water and groundwater 
flooding. 
 Risks to public water 
supplies from drought and 
low river flows (England & 
Wales). 
 Risks to infrastructure 
services from coastal 
flooding and erosion 
(England & Wales). 
 Risks of sewer flooding due 
to heavy rainfall 
 Risks to transport networks 
from embankment failure. 
 Risks of cascading failures 
from interdependent 
infrastructure networks. 
 Risks to public water 
supplies from drought 
and low river flows 
(Scotland & Northern 
Ireland). 
 Risks to transport, ICT 
and energy 
infrastructure from 
extreme heat. 
 Opportunities for 
water, transport, digital 
and energy 
infrastructure from 
reduced frequency of 
extreme cold events. 
 Risks to bridges and 
pipelines from high 
river flows and bank 
erosion. 
 Risks to 
infrastructure 
services from coastal 
flooding and erosion 
(Scotland & 
Northern Ireland). 
 Risks to energy, 
transport and ICT 
infrastructure from 
high winds and 
lightning. 
 Risks to offshore 
infrastructure from 
storms and high 
waves (England, 
Scotland & Wales). 
 Risks to hydroelectric 
generation from low or 
high river flows. 
 Risks to subterranean 
and surface 
infrastructure from 
subsidence. 
 Risks to electricity 
generation from 
drought and low river 
flows. 
 Risks to offshore 
infrastructure from 
storms and high waves 
(Northern Ireland). 
 
 
Table 3 Percentage of some infrastructure assets at risk from different sources of flooding. 
 Source of flooding 
 River or coastal Surface water Groundwater 
Power stations 41 6 18 
Railway track 17 9 17 
Railway stations 14 3 16 
Motorways and A-roads 9 6 9 
Clean water and wastewater treatment plants 33 12 24 
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Table 2 Summary of the adaptation urgency for climate change risks to UK infrastructure. 
 
Table 3 Percentage of some infrastructure assets at risk from different sources of flooding. 
 
Figure captions 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual view of infrastructure as a system (from [20]). 
 
Figure 2 A systems approach to a climate change risk assessment framework for infrastructure, with some 
indicative variables or risks at each assessment stage (from [20]). 
 
Figure 3 Key relationships between climate hazards and each infrastructure sector. A light shade denotes a 
relationship exists, a darker shade denotes the relationship is strong. Dependencies between infrastructures 
are not shown here. 
 
Figure 4 Relationship between global temperature change relative to pre-industrial era, and some of the key 
climate change risks to UK infrastructure.  A high risk of flooding has a likelihood of flooding more frequently 
than 1 in 75 years (AEP≥0.013).  The assessment of global change risks is taken from [12]. 
 
 
 
